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IMPROVING ONE'S SITUATION: SOME PRAGMATIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE ART OF JUDGING
CAMMH'IE PIERCE WELLS*
As legal theorists, we live in an age of self-conscious repetition: eve-
rything is "neo" and nothing is new. There are neo-realists, neo-formalists,
neo-conservatives, and neo-pragmatists to name just a few. And what is
not "neo" is "post" as in post-structuralist, post-colonial, and even post-
critical. Indeed, the newest theories sound pointedly antitheoretical as de-
constructionists, feminists, and critical legal scholars argue in various ways
that conventional theory making is but one more mechanism for oppressing
the powerless. In all this theory consciousness, it is difficult to have simple
thoughts and it is especially difficult to think simply about judging because
judging has been the object of so much theoretical attention. This is too
bad. Judging, I think, is a little like riding a bicycle-if you are teetering
out of control, it is unlikely that a complicated theory will help to restore
the balance. Simple thoughts are more useful; they are easier to internalize
and therefore more accessible when needed.
In what follows, I wish to make two simple points. The first is that
the act of judging is an inherently situated activity. Justice Cardozo made
this point most clearly:
There is in each of us a stream of tendency ... which gives
coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape
that current any more than other mortals. All their lives, forces
which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging
at them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions;
... In this mental background every problem finds its setting. We
may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we
can never see them with any eyes except our own.'
Thus, my first point is that every legal judgment is made from a particular
perspective. And my second point follows from the first: if judging is a
situated activity, then judges should attend to their situation in a consci-
entious way. While "we can never see with any eyes except our own," we
can broaden our situation in such a way that our "stream(s) of tendency"
are more receptive to the different perspectives that exist in the world we
are seeking to judge.
Before beginning, I would like to emphasize a couple of general con-
siderations. The first is the ethical maxim that "ought" implies "can." No
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matter how strong the reasons may be for thinking that judges should be
fully constrained by formal law, these reasons are insufficient so long as
the judge cannot escape the effects of his or her own particular situation.
The second is that the question of situated decisionmaking is not just an
abstract matter. It has important consequences for thinking about how
judges ought to approach their task.2 If judges can properly consider
themselves impersonal decisionmakers (i.e., if their decisions are fully de-
termined by substantive doctrines and by normative theories that are objec-
tively and universally true) then the ideal judge will invest his or her efforts
in learning as much about substantive law and normative theory as (s)he
can. If, on the other hand, the judge's personal history, character and
outlook have a substantial effect on legal decisionmaking, then the ideal
judge should pay attention to this fact. In considering these two alternatives,
it is important to bear in mind that a position in the middle ground-for
example, the position that normative decisions are a product of both
personal situation and formal legal reasons-requires us to become more
self-conscious about situation. Being "a little bit situated" is like being "a
little bit pregnant"-it is foolish to ignore the fact simply because it is only
a little bit true.
In the next two sections, I will explore some of the reasons why it
makes sense to recognize the situated character of legal decisionmaking.
Some of these reasons arise in the context of legal theory. In traditional
terms, the issue of situated decisionmaking can be understood in terms of
the debate between formalists and realists about the extent of judicial
discretion. The first section briefly considers this debate. Other reasons stem
from more philosophical considerations. As modern philosophy has analyzed
logic and science, it has generated insights that are useful in thinking about
judicial decisionmaking. The second section briefly summarizes two different
philosophical approaches. The first draws from work by Wittgenstein and
others; it attacks the central concept of an impersonal decisionmaker whose
discretion is fully constrained by the formal rules of inference. The second
arises from a pragmatic understanding of normative judgments. From a
pragmatic perspective, all forms of decisionmaking are inherently situated:
a sound, or rational, decision is sound, or rational, only in the context of
a given situation and, then, only with respect to the accomplishment of
certain specified purposes. Thus, the pragmatist sees legal decisionmaking
as a rational but situated activity.
I. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: TIE DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL DIscRETION
As enunciated by Langdell, classical formalism rested upon three basic
assertions: first, that legal reasoning begins with distinctly legal premises;
second, that legal method is deductive; and third, that every case has one
2. See discussion infra part III.
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and only one correct legal outcome. 3 It is from formalists such as Langdell
that we get the notion that judges should strive to be impersonal decision-
makers. An impersonal decisionmaker is one who decides the case without
reference to his or her personal views or character. In short, (s)he decides
the case in accordance with law where "law" is understood as a publicly
discernible body of rules and theory that is sufficient for pairing any factual
situation with the correct legal outcome.
The opposite of classical formalism is extreme realism. Extreme realists
oppose formalism by denying each of its elements. First, they argue that
there is no such thing as distinctly legal premises-so-called "legal" prin-
ciples really derive from considerations of social policy and social theory.
To the extent that law has developed independently of these considerations,
it must be seen as arbitrary and indeterminate-as consisting of empty
generalizations that are chanted for the sake of appearance but are not
decisive with respect to individual cases. 4 Second, they reject the notion of
law as a deductive enterprise. And third, they deny that every legal problem
has one uniquely correct answer and argue instead that law is an inherently
personal enterprise. In their view, judges respond not to legal considerations
but instead to such subjective items as their own class interest, 5 their personal
psychological pathology, 6 or their vision of the social good. 7
When one sets out these two positions as boldly as I have done, it
seems obvious that neither of them is correct. Surely, the truth about legal
decisionmaking lies somewhere in between these two extremes. In a moment
I will try to develop such a middle position. In the meantime, however, it
is important to say a few words about the argument between realism and
3. According to Langdell, the common law represented a quasi-philosophical system
that was not based upon considerations of convenience, equity or social policy. CHRISTOPHER
C. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF CONTRACTS (1880).
4. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) (arguing that law
generally operates symbolically and ceremonially). In this respect, Arnold certainly stood at
the extreme end of the realist movement. It is common, however, to read even the moderate
realists as making the same basic point. For example, the famous essay by Joseph C. Hutcheson,
Jr. entitled The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929), is frequently interpreted in this way. To the contrary, I believe that
this reading is incorrect. The process of giving legal reasons may not affect the outcome of
the current case but, over time, the development of these reasons helps to construct our
understanding of future cases. For a partial explanation of this process, see John Dewey,
Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924).
5. Oliver W. Holmes, Comment on the Gas Stoker's Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582, 584
(1873) (discussing impact of class interest on judge's perspective). More recently, this argument
has been taken up by those in the Critical Legal Studies movement. MORTON J. HORwTrz,
THE TRAN SFORMATON OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 253-66 (1977); Alan Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest For Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 295, 343-53 (1988).
6. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (arguing that judging is
best understood in terms of judicial psychology).
7. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or, How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A.J.
357, 358 (1925) (discussing how judge's social values influence his decision making).
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formalism as it is traditionally constructed. The terms "realism" and
"formalism" have dominated discussions about legal decisionmaking for
half a century. These terms have been understood to designate two mutually
exclusive conceptions that together exhaust the field of what can be usefully
said about judging. Thus, theories are generally described as "formalist"
or "realist" even though most theories of judicial decisionmaking combine
elements of both. One problem with this approach is that it undermines
rigorous analysis by elevating differences of degree and emphasis to the
level of fundamental disagreement. A more serious problem, however, is
that the realist, formalist dichotomy constructs the controversy over judicial
decisionmaking in an oversimple and misleading way.
The dispute between realism and formalism is commonly phrased as a
disagreement about judicial discretion: Is a judge bound by law' or does
(s)he have unbounded discretion to decide the case any way (s)he likes. 9 So
conceived, the discussion then turns to whether legal theory should be
descriptive or normative. If the aim is descriptive, then the realist is right
in suggesting that law is such a loosely woven fabric that judges can decide
cases in any way they like and still be able to reconcile their choices with
prevailing legal norms. If the aim is normative, however, then the formalists
are correct in arguing that judges should aspire to something better. Modern
formalists concede that law is not perfectly determinate but remind us that
the rule of law represents humankind's best effort at fair and impartial
adjudication. For this reason, they argue, judges should not only obey the
law's unequivocal commands but should also follow its barest hints and
suggestions. Thus, for the past forty years, the world of legal theory has
been divided into two camps. In one camp are those who develop the theme
of law's indeterminacy. These theorists argue that legal decisionmaking is
inherently situated. In the other camp are those who argue that judges must
aspire to make their decisions in accordance with the rule of law. These
theorists argue that judges should strive to be impersonal; that they should
be moved, so far as possible, by legal rather than personal considerations.
Viewed in these terms, the rule of law position seems to have a great
deal of force. Judges are not personal actors. They receive the delegation
of judicial power subject to an important trust. They should not act like
opportunists who glance around looking for loopholes. Instead they should
be painstaking in their efforts to determine what the law-their particular
and sacred charge-requires. It seems to me, however, that the strength of
this argument stems from the oversimple division of the world of legal
8. In the modern era, the phrase "bound by law" is no longer limited to the kind of
substantive legal doctrine that Langdell had in mind. Legal constraints are generally understood
as being supplemented by various other norms such as shared values, economic efficiency, or
objective moral truths.
9. Legal writers often talk about a judge's ability to "decide the case in any way he
or she likes" but, as my colleague Professor Richard Craswell points out in his class, there is
considerable ambiguity in this formulation of the realist's claim. On some readings, the claim
is trivial; on others, it is entirely implausible.
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theory into realist (prodiscretion) and formalist (antidiscretion) factions. Of
course judges should aspire to be fair and impartial but it is equally true
that this does not convert them into impersonal computers. As we shall see
in the next section, there are strong reasons for thinking that the impersonal
model cannot be realized and that there is an element of situated judgment.
in every legal decision. If this is true, then judges are as responsible for
thinking about their situation as they are for knowing the substantive law.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF IMPERSONAL
DECISIONMAKING
Let us pay more careful attention to the claim that legal decisionmaking
can proceed in an impersonal manner. What would it take for it to be true?
First, it requires that there be a body of substantive doctrine that will
provide sufficient justification for declaring what the law requires with
respect to a wide range of individual controversies. Secondly, it requires a
decisionmaking procedure by which these general principles of law can be
invoked in the decision of cases. Thus, the impersonal judge needs both a
set of declarative statements about the extent of legal entitlements and a
set of approved protocols that license moving from the abstract proposition
to the decision of a specific case. And, finally, in order for the decision to
be fully impersonal, these two sets of items must be sufficient to determine
a uniquely correct outcome. 0
1. The Formal Approach
To understand the formal arguments about impersonal decisionmaking,
it is necessary to understand the logical distinction between propositions
and rules of inference. Propositions describe states of affairs such as: All
persons are mortal. Rules of inference, on the other hand, license a
movement from one belief, or set of beliefs, to another. Thus, we could
have a rule with the following form: If one believes that all persons are
mortal and that Tom is a person then one can, or should, also believe that
Tom is mortal. This is, in fact, an instance of a familiar logical rule:
Modus ponens: If ((if A then B) and A) then B.
As I have just written it, the principle of modus ponens looks like a
proposition. But, when it is written this way, it loses its essential ability to
license real world beliefs and inferences. Years ago, Lewis Carroll illustrated
this point with a pointed story about Achilles and the Tortoise." The story
begins with a challenge to Achilles. The Tortoise sets out three propositions
from Euclid:
(A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
10. These requirements for impersonal decisionmaking, in fact, echo the characteristics
of Langdell's formalism. There are some differences. For example, Langdell thought that the
premises of judicial decisionmaking had a distinctly legal character while modem formalists
are willing to supplement substantive law with various other kinds of normative theories. But
the basic outline of nondiscretionary inferences leading to a uniquely correct resolution remains.
11. Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise said to Achilles, reprinted in, READINGS ON Looic
117 (Irving M. Copi & James A. Gould eds., 2d ed. 1972).
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(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the
same.
(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other. 2
and claims to believe that A and B are true but that Z is not. He then
challenges Achilles to "force (him), logically, to accept Z as true." Achilles
replies that, obviously, the problem is that the Tortoise does not accept the
hypothetical: "If A and B are true, then Z must be true." When the
Tortoise acknowledges this, Achilles writes down the hypothetical as:
(C) If A and B, then Z
and asks the tortoise to accept it as a premise. So then there are three
premises-A, B, and C-and when Achilles once again asks the Tortoise
to acknowledge the truth of Z, the Tortoise replies that he will do so only
if Achilles will add yet another premise to those he has written on his
tablet. The premise is:
(D) If A and B and C, then Z.
Achilles adds the premise and the conversation continues:
"And at last we've got to the end of this ideal race-course! Now
that you accept A and B and C and D, of course you accept Z."
"Do I?" said the Tortoise innocently "Let's make that quite clear.
I accept A and B and C and D. Suppose I still refuse to accept
Z?"
"Then logic would take you by the throat and force you to do it!"
Achilles triumphantly replied. "Logic would tell you 'You can't
help yourself. Now that you've accepted A and B and C and D,
you must accept Z!' So you've no choice, you see."
"Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down,"
said the Tortoise. "So enter it in your book, please. We will call
it-
(E) If A and B and C and D are true, Z must be true. 3
"Until I've granted that, of course, I needn't grant Z. So it's quite
a necessary step, you see?"
"I see," said Achilles; and there was a touch of sadness in his
tone.
Obviously this line of argument will postpone the inference indefinitely. The
Tortoise will not make the inference unless the rule is included among the
premises and, once it is included among the premises, it loses all power to
license the inference.
The story of Achilles and the Tortoise illustrates an important point
not just about formal logic but also about the general problem of deciding
cases in accordance with a rule. Rules are required to license behavior in
any rule-bound setting. This means, among other things, that having a rule
creates an ambiguity about truth. Consider, for example, two sentences:
12. Id. at 118-119.
13. Id. at 119-20.
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(1) All supermen are faster than a speeding bullet.
(2) All supermen may help the police fight crime.
The first sentence is descriptive. If it is true, then all supermen are faster
than a speeding bullet. The second is a rule. It can be false in a descriptive
sense-not all Supermen help the police-but it may still be 'true' in the
sense that it genuinely does license a particular kind of conduct. Thus,
understanding a rule is to know what it licenses in a diverse range of
situations and this kind of understanding is peculiarly problematic. As
Wittgenstein and others have pointed out, there are puzzling difficulties
associated with the seemingly simple phenomena of grasping a rule, follow-
ing a rule, and knowing what a rule means. Wittgenstein said it most
succinctly "this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the
rule." 4
This seems paradoxical indeed. To make sense of it, we need to think
carefully about the nature of rules. They are not, as we have seen, simply
propositions that can be written down in Achilles' book. Instead, a rule
represents a routinized way of responding to like cases. Rules are amor-
phous. They may be announced or articulated. They can be evidenced by
a course of conduct that is understood as being rule governed. Or they can
simply consist of unstated and vague expectations about the nature of future
conduct. Suppose, for example, that I sell you a bagel every morning for
a week and, in accordance with my rule, charge you one dollar. Suppose
further that, on the eighth day, I demand two dollars. Have I changed my
price or was I operating under the rule that I would charge one dollar for
the first seven bagels and two dollars for the eighth? In either case, there
is nothing wrong or inconsistent about my behavior. And the latter inter-
pretation can be correct even if I had never previously articulated how my
rule would apply to the sale of bagels on the eighth day. 5 I am free at any
moment to recognize a particular set of circumstances as triggering a
particular response under my rule or not. The rule can only tell me what
happens if it applies, it cannot go further and tell me whether it applies to
the case at hand. Like the Tortoise, I am confronted with an ad hoc decision
about the application of the rule and, as logical and inevitable as these
decisions sometimes feel, they are all inherently situated in what Cardozo
calls the decisionmaker's "inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, and ac-
quired convictions.' 6
The point can be put more precisely in the context of formal deductive
reasoning. Listen, for example, to Michael Dummett writing about mathe-
matics:
14. Investigations section 201. The translation is by Kripke. See SAUK, KRIPKE, Wfrr-
GENSTMIN: ON RuIJsS AND PRrvATE LANGUAGE (1982) (viewing problem of private languages as
similar to problem of induction).
15. There are many different ways of interpreting or explaining the Wittgensteinian point.
The example I give was inspired by Kripke's interpretation. See supra note 14.
16. Cardozo, supra note 1, at 12-13.
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:323
A proof proceeds according to certain logical principles or rules of
inference. We are inclined to suppose that once we have accepted
the axioms from which the proof starts, we have, as it were, no
further active part to play; when the proof is shown us, we are
mere passive spectators. But in order to follow the proof, we have
to recognize various transitions as applications of the general rules
of inference. Now even if these rules had been explicitly formulated
at the start, and we had given our assent to them, our doing so
would not in itself constitute recognition of each transition as a
correct application of the rules .... Hence at each step we are free
to choose to accept or reject the proof; there is nothing in our
formulation of the axioms and of the rules of inference, and nothing
in our minds when we accepted these before the proof was given,
which of itself shows whether we shall accept the proof or not; and
hence there is nothing which forces us to accept the proof. If we
accept the proof, we confer necessity of the theorem proved; we
"put it in the archives" and will count nothing as telling against
it. In doing this we are making a new decision, and not merely
making explicit a decision we had already made implicitly.
17
As Dummett argues in the above passage, a person who draws a
deductive inference cannot be a passive spectator. Applying a rule of
inference to the premises of an argument requires an active decision about
whether to "recognize various transitions as applications of the rule." This
is because "[tihere is nothing in our formulation of the axioms and of the
rules of inference, and nothing in our minds ... which of itself shows
whether we shall accept the proof or not."' 8 And this feature of deductive
reasoning is similar to a phenomenon that has been frequently observed by
legal theorists. The rules utilized by legal reasoning contain many vague
terms and unstated exceptions and, for this reason, application of a rule is
not merely a matter of determining whether certain formal conditions apply.
Application also requires that we have an intuitive grasp of the rule-an
ability to determine which of many logically possible exceptions are in the
"spirit" of the rule and also relevant to the case at hand. Thus, legal and
deductive reasoning have this in common-they both require an active
participant who can decide on each occasion whether the occasion is an
appropriate one for applying a rule.
2. The Pragmatic Approach
The formal arguments outlined above suggest that an impersonal model
of normative decisionmaking is not a feasible option. This is because a
17. Michael Dummett, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics, reprinted in BERNA-
cERAF & HII.ARY PUTNAM, READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS; SELECTED READINos
491, 495 (1964).
18. Id.
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decision that involves the application of a rule is not-and logically cannot
be-constrained by the rule in question. This being the case, some theorists
embrace a form of rule skepticism by concluding that legal rules have little
(or no) effect on legal decisionnaking. But their conclusion seems somewhat
extreme: the observation that decisionmaking involves an irreducible human
agency does not necessarily entail the conclusion that rules are irrelevant to
the decisionmaking process. As an alternative, we might well want to
consider a more moderate approach-an approach that explores the possi-
bility that decisions are properly affected both by rules and by more
contextual considerations. One such approach stems from a pragmatic
philosophy and is based upon an analysis of actual decisionmaking practices.
Its aim is to develop a conception of situated rationality that does not rely
upon the notion of impersonal decisionmaking.
From a pragmatic perspective, one of the difficulties with traditional
legal theory is that it makes an absolute distinction between fact and value.
Thus, for example, it pits the realist "is" against the formalist "ought."
The pragmatist rejects this division and urges instead that every abstract
conception should be understood in relation to its consequences for human
activity. 9 This means that every theory should be seen as a theory about a
particular practice and, more specifically, as a theory that generates impli-
cations for the reform of that practice. For example, a pragmatic theory
of bridge building should begin by looking at actual practices of bridge
construction. The examination of these practices is both descriptive and
normative; it is not aimed simply at enumerating the methods of construction
but at determining which methods produce the "best" bridges. And the
question-What is the best bridge?-cannot be answered in the abstract;
we cannot give the same answer on the first day as we might give after a
thousand years of bridge building. Theory and practice evolve together
within a context of human purpose and activity; the practice informs the
theory while the theory, in turn, informs the practice. Thus, the hallmark
of a pragmatic method is its continual reevaluation of practices in the light
of the norms that govern them and of the norms in the light of the practices
they generate. 20
A pragmatic theory of judicial decisionmaking conforms to this model
by beginning its analysis with an examination of actual decisionmaking
practices. And, when this is done, it becomes clear that the formalist model
does not adequately describe the complexity and diversity of these practices. 2'
In this discussion, I will focus on two aspects of decisionmaking that I
19. CHARLES S. PEIRcE, V Tm COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLEs SANDERS PEIRCE 5.402
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934) (discussing pragmatic maxim).
20. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification
for Jury Adjudication, 88 MicH. L. REv. 2348, 2361-62 (1990) (describing nature of pragmatic
inquiries).
21. Indeed, an adequate description of these practices would fill many volumes. In Wells,
supra note 20 I have tried in another context to examine some aspects of these practices more
fully. See Wells, supra note 20 (giving more comprehensive treatment to pragmatic inquiries).
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believe are fundamental to the judge's task: the first is a type of structured
reasoning; the second is a more contextual mode of analysis. I will begin
by briefly describing these two forms of deliberation. 22 I will then argue
that a judge does a good job of making a decision only when (s)he engages
in both forms of deliberation in a conscientious way.
Structured reasoning requires that the decisionmaker locate the contro-
versy within a web (or several different webs) of relevant normative analysis.
Suppose that a judge must decide a question under the due process clause.
In such a case, it is important to determine how the issue is constructed by
contemporary constitutional doctrine and, if there are competing doctrines,
how it is constructed by each. It is also relevant to consider contemporary
norms of fairness, theories about the constitutional roles of court and
legislature, theories about the interactions of state and federal courts, and
so forth. A good judge is a theory sophisticate because it is only by locating
an issue within these various theories that a judge can understand the full
extent of the controversy. Locating an issue in this way is to examine the
issue from the outside in-we start with various theories that can be
articulated independently of the problem and then we understand the
problem within a structure that is defined by these theories.
It is also essential for a judge to understand the problem from the
inside out. Understanding the case requires more than just an ability to
summarize the pertinent facts; it entails also an ability to empathize and
connect with the various parties. Who are these people? What is this case
about from their point of view? And how, as a practical matter, will they
be affected by a judgment in this case? In answering these questions, the
judge often engages in a variety of activities that would not be relevant in
the context of a structured inquiry. (S)he may, for example, engage in a
certain amount of relatively undirected fact gathering. (S)he might attempt
to reconstruct the event from the differing perspectives of the parties and
then to reconcile these differing perspectives into a single coherent'account.
In the course of these efforts, the judge will develop an intuitive response
to the case as a whole and this response will form the basis of further
exploration and self-criticism. Thus, contextual analysis requires a complex
process of understanding the case in an intuitive and commonsensical way.
It is important to note that the distinction between these two forms of
deliberation is not an "either-or" choice-a decisionmaker cannot simply
choose to decide the case in one way or the other. Remember Achilles and
the Tortoise-the Tortoise will not come to a conclusion until he is willing
to make a bottom line judgment about the logical consequences of the
premises he has adopted. This mental process of judgment is not optional-
the tortoise must make the judgment even if he does not do so in a
conscious (or conscientious) way. Similarly, even if a judge focuses exclu-
sively on the structured aspects of the case, the contextual elements will not
22. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1728, 173 1-
37 (1990) (discussing structured reasoning and contextual analysis at length).
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disappear. The only thing that happens when (s)he proceeds this way is that
(s)he substitutes stereotypical conceptions and default assumptions for what
(s)he might have learned by engaging in a contextual analysis. And the
same is true for a judge who ignores structured considerations and relies
solely upon an intuitive grasp of the situation. (S)he overlooks the fact that
intuitive judgments are significantly affected by whatever theories the de-
cisionmaker happens to hold. Thus, a judge who decides not to think about
theory simply allows his or her decision to be affected by a theory that
(s)he has not chosen in a conscious and reflective way.
The above discussion suggests that good normative decisionmaking
requires attention to both the structured and contextual elements of delib-
eration. To further support this idea, I will offer an analogy that highlights
the importance of both forms of analysis. Imagine that you have an
important decision that must be delegated to another. For example, suppose
that you must choose someone to decide about medical treatment in case
you become incompetent. In making this choice, what qualities would you
look for? Certainly, you would want someone who was capable of under-
standing all of the relevant information and theories about your condition.
It would, after all, be extremely unfortunate if (s)he were to make an
avoidable mistake about the probabilities of recovery or about whether, in
your vegetative state, you were capable of suffering and experiencing pain.
On the other hand, you would be looking for more than technical aptitude.
You would want a person who was capable of understanding you as a
person-what your life stands for and what it might mean to you in the
future. In short, the person you choose ought to understand not just the
explicit criteria that are important to you but also the nuances of individ-
uality and personality that are inevitably implicated by such an important
decision.
There are some obvious similarities between the above example and
judicial decisionmaking. Both cases involve delegated decisions where the
delegation includes criteria that are relevant to the decision but does not
specify the desired outcome under every conceivable circumstance. In both
instances, the analogy suggests, we are looking for someone who excels at
both structured and contextual analysis. On the other hand, the analogy is
not exact. Certainly, some legal theorists would argue that there are fun-
damental differences between these two types of delegation. In the first
case, (s)he might argue, I delegate a uniquely personal decision to a friend
or relative and am understandably concerned about the decisionmaker's
ability to emphasize with my personal situation. In the second case, society
as a whole delegates a collective problem to a public official and is therefore
more likely to be concerned with publicly stated justifications for judgment.
But this conclusion seems to rest upon an overly simplistic conception of
the legal enterprise. Certainly it is true that much of the legitimacy that
surrounds judicial decisionmaking is related to the expectation that judges
will make their decisions in accordance with legal principles. It is equally
true, however, that many important legal decisions raise questions that are
significantly related to the community's deepest aspirations. As citizens, we
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want these cases decided in a way that resonates with our collective identity
and courts that ignore these considerations fall rapidly into public disrespect.
Thus, the legal community is much like the patient who must delegate
treatment decisions: it needs a judge who has not just theoretical expertise
but also a deep understanding of the community's collective self-its present
sense of identity and its most significant aspirations for the future.
Thus far, I have argued that every legal decision is the result of two
very different modes of deliberation. On the one hand, there is a highly
structured analysis that moves from the outside in and alms at analyzing
the specific controversy in accordance with certain theoretical considerations.
On the other hand, there is a more contextual exploration of the controversy
that moves from the inside out and alms at prompting sound intuitive
recommendations for its resolution. Structured reasoning transforms the
case into an instance of a more general rule; contextual reasoning recreates
the controversy as an individual narrative that requires an outcome satis-
factory to our sense of doing justice in this particular case. I have also
argued that conscientious performance of both these elements is essential
to reaching a good decision. It is now time to consider what constitutes
conscientious performance or, more generally, how decisionmakers can
perform these functions in a fair and judicious way.
III. CONCLUSION: SITUATED DECISIONMAKmr AND ITS OBLIGATIONS
This paper is based upon a contrast between the notion of impersonal
decisionmaking-the kind that a computer might do-and situated decision-
making-the kind that requires a real human agency. In the previous
sections, I have argued that legal decisionmaking is at least partially situated;
that judges are not computers but that they are not entirely free from legal
constraint. This is hardly a controversial result. Most observers-that is
most observers who are not in the grips of some sort of theory driven
extremism-recognize that legal judgments do occupy this kind of middle
ground. And, given the common sense appeal of this kind of middle
position, it is surprising that its normative consequences are so little under-
stood. To explore these consequences, we must think more carefully about
the process of legal judgment and the issue of fairness as it applies to this
process. This, then, is the point of a pragmatic analysis. An examination
of decisionmaking practices is only the beginning. The ultimate issue to be
addressed is whether these practices are adequate representations of our
ideals of fairness and justice and, if they are not, what can be done to
render them more adequate. Thus, in this concluding section, I will outline
what I think follows from the fact that legal decisionmaking is inherently
situated.
The first thing that must be recognized is that both the structured and
contextual elements of legal decisionmaking are inherently situated. This is
easy to see with respect to contextual analysis. Obviously, a process that
relies upon intuition and common sense will be significantly affected by the
nature of the judge's background, temperament, and prior experience. It is
PRA GMA TIC REFLECTIONS
harder to see how these factors affect structured analysis. In a structured
analysis, a decisionmaker chooses a normative theory to structure the
problem. For those who believe in impersonal decisionmaking, the appli-
cation of a general normative theory is thought to be the very essence of
impersonal decisionmaking. The pragmatist reminds us, however, that every
theory must be understood as an explanation of a particular set of experi-
ences and evaluated with respect to its usefulness in achieving a particular
set of goals. For example, particle physics does a good job of explaining
certain sophisticated experimental data but it is not very useful in planning
a billiard shot. Thus, when a judge selects the theory that (s)he will use to
decide the case, the selection is made relative to a situation that includes
his or her prior experience and his or her sense of the purpose to be served
in a case of this kind. A judge may strive, in Dworkin's terms, to use the
best available theory3 but, from a pragmatic perspective, determining which
theory is "best" requires that we answer certain other questions: "Whose
experience are we trying to explain?" and "For what tasks must the theory
be useful?" And, for this reason, the use of any theory-even "the best"
theory-is inherently situated.
One way to understand this point more clearly is to consider an
analogy.24 Suppose that a traveller is lost in an unfamiliar territory and it
is your job to help him home. If you had maps of the relevant territory,
you might use a structured approach. You might, for example, ask him
questions about the surrounding terrain until you had enough information
to place him on the map. Thus, the use of a structured approach presupposes
that we are able to locate the traveller (define the problem) within the map
(in terms of a theory) by means of certain identifying features (legally
relevant features) that are contained on the map (in the theory) itself. A
contextual approach, on the other hand, is what you might use if you could
join the traveller and begin to explore. You might, for example, try various
roads and ask directions of the people you meet. In short, a contextual
approach allows us to solve a problem by exploiting our potential connection
with it. We put ourselves in the traveler's shoes, rather than trying to locate
him in the larger universe.
The two approaches represent the difference between zeroing in on a
spot from afar or starting with the spot and working our way outward.
The virtue of the first approach is that it removes us from the traveller's
subjective situation into an objective but abstract conception of his terrain.
The strength of the second approach is that it brings us closer to the
problem by placing us "on the spot." Each approach has an advantage but
neither approach can function alone. Structured reasoning utilizes abstrac-
tion and reason, but the usefulness of these tools depends upon the accuracy
23. See RONALD M. Dwoamw, LAW'S EMPnRE (1986) (urging that judges should strive to
apply best available theories).
24. I have developed this analogy at greater length in Situated Decisionmaking. Wells,
supra note 22, at 1740.
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of the information that they analyze. Thus, to make an accurate map, it is
necessary to have accurate "on the spot" observations. Similarly, contextual
analysis will not get far so long as individual observations remain uninter-
preted. The contextual rescuer will not be effective unless (s)he makes some
effort to map out, i.e., to record and interpret, what (s)he sees.
The mapmaking analogy helps us to understand the manner in which
each of these approaches are relative to an individual's perspective and
viewpoint. A contextual analysis relies upon individual observations and are
thus "situated" in the sense that each observation is made relative to an
individual viewpoint. A structured analysis, by contrast, seems to be less
situated in that the maps (or theories) that they use are based upon
observations that have been obtained from many different viewpoints. Even
so, maps can never be entirely free of perspective. Consider two different
maps: One is drawn by a giant who is hunting tigers; the other is drawn
by a Lilliputian who is seeking a sunny place for a nap. Will these two
maps look the same? Which one is more objective? Are footprints or rays
of sunshine the objective features of this terrain.
All this tells us something important about the nature of judicial
decisionmaking. A judge appears to render a verdict that is not the product
of his or her own beliefs but is instead the result of applying a legal or
normative theory to the facts of an individual case. The mapmaking analogy
reminds us that this process is not so impersonal as it appears. First the
judge must make a situated judgment about the nature of the case: Is the
plaintiff on tenth street by the water tower or on first street by the river?
Second, (s)he must make a situated choice of theory: Should (s)he get his
or her maps from the Lilliputians or the Giants? In many cases, these sorts
of questions are not controversial. They frequently do not test the limits of
our individuality and idiosyncracy. But it is nevertheless important to
understand that there will be times when a. decision that feels like a
straightforward application of a traditional legal principle is, in reality,
something much more difficult-something that requires us to be mindful
of who we are and the purposes that we are trying to accomplish.
As human beings, our individual perspectives are such intimate and
constant companions that we forget that they are there. Thus, we need
constant reminders that we each have our own distinctive window on the
world. We are large or small. We hunt tigers or rays of sunshine. We notice
and understand what is familiar and what is useful to our projects. And
judges do not shed these facts of human existence merely because they hold
judicial office. Most judges understand some things well and other things
only poorly. Like all of us, judges possess a limited viewpoint and limited
powers of empathy and imagination and they bring these limitations to the
decision of every case. This does not mean that we should accuse judges
of making irrational or political decisions. Nor does it mean that we must
resign ourselves to replacing the rule of law with the force of arms. If we
look to our actual decisionmaking practices to see that there is no need to
resort to such extremes. Not all legal decisions involve disparities in view-
point. Commercial litigants, for example, frequently share a common out-
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look that governs their joint undertakings. And, even when they do not,
their differences are frequently not extreme. In a consumer transaction, for
example, one party is operating in a commercial context while the other is
involved in a purely personal capacity. Nevertheless, courts and legislatures
have been able to define a common framework that can be comfortably
occupied by both points of view. On the other hand, there are cases that
test the limits of judicial experience and imagination. Consider the question
of whether it is constitutional to force a drug addicted mother to make a
choice between incarceration or abortion. How many of us can think about
this question from her point of view? How many of us could imagine how
the case would appear to her potential child? And, if we fail in our attempts
to make a common sense connection with this context, how can we speak
meaningfully about privacy or respect for human life as it applies to this
situation? How can we decide what the Constitution requires once we
acknowledge that thinking about context is a legitimate part of the inquiry?
One answer to this problem is to appoint judges who represent a wide
range of experience and viewpoint. Indeed, it is often said that the diversity
of contemporary life requires an equally diverse judiciary. But, while I
favor a diverse judiciary, I do not believe that it is a practical response to
the problem of situated decisionmaking. Perhaps it is true that women
judges have a clearer perspective on problems associated with pregnancy.
Perhaps it is true but perhaps it is not. What would it take to judge this
case from the viewpoint of the parties? A judge who is, or has been, a
drug addict? A child judge? Or a judge who survived a fetal addiction?
And where does this need for specialized judgment end? Does every litigant
deserve a psycho-social twin who can fully understand her perspective?
Obviously, the answer to this question must be no-we do not need "psycho-
social twins" but we do need judges who are receptive to other perspectives.
It may be true that I can, in Cardozo's words, "never see with any eyes
except my own" but I can nevertheless do better or worse at making
meaningful connections with the experience of others. Given this, it seems
to me that an important project for legal theory is to develop a more
rigorous analysis about the effect of viewpoints on legal decisionmaking
and to develop ways in which the law could become more responsive to
disparities in viewpoint. This is a large agenda but I would like to make a
start by identifying three topics for further discussion.
The first is a reexamination of the tradition that requires judges to be
reclusive. Undoubtedly, it is inappropriate for judges to be leading protest
marches. But, short of this, there is no reason to require that judges isolate
themselves from the problems of contemporary life. What is needed is a
better balance.
The second is that all of us who study and practice law should read
more widely about the divergent cultures that are now a part of the American
scene. In law, there is a veritable explosion of writers who are exploring
legal questions from nontraditional perspectives. And we do not need to
confine ourselves to legal theory. Indisputably the United States has become
multicultural. It is therefore time for all of us who think about law to work
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at learning about life in the context of these different cultures. The truth
is that many of us know a great deal more about Jane Austen's England
than we do about the daily life of most Americans. And surely the fact
that our viewpoint is focused in this way has a substantial impact upon our
understanding of legal questions. Law and culture are intimately connected
and we cannot be knowledgeable about one while remaining ignorant of
the other.
Third, as lawyers, scholars and judges we ought to strive to be fair
minded. Fairness requires that we consider all points of view and this, in
turn, requires that we open our minds and our hearts to the viewpoints of
others. In short, we must be receptive to the lived experience of all persons
who stand before the law. And this means opening ourselves to the pain
of others. It means facing the discomfort of admitting that we do not have
all the answers. And, most importantly, it means forswearing detachment
and risking the admission that life has anchored us in a particular web of
experience and desire in which we are personal rather than impersonal agents
of the legal order.
